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This article explores the largely unsung Moscow ambassadorship of Britain’s 
Frank Roberts, 1960-62. After examining his Embassy’s role in developing 
cultural and commercial relations, the article addresses Roberts’ involvement in 
the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. In the former case, he made a low-key but 
important contribution by influencing American policy, while in the second case 
he provided insightful assessments of Soviet attitudes and thinking. It is argued 
that Roberts’ ambassadorship demonstrated the continued importance of the 
resident embassy and ambassador, because of the lack of ministerial-level Anglo-
Soviet relations and because of the need to interpret Soviet policy in crisis 
situations. The research contributes to the literature of diplomatic representation 
as well as of Anglo-Soviet relations during the Cold War. 
 
It is fair to say that Cold War relations between Britain and the Soviet Union were of 
limited substance, due to the ideological differences and to the close British relationship 
with the United States. Nonetheless, for Sir Frank Roberts, British ambassador in 
Moscow, 1960-62, there was ‘never a dull moment’,2 with the striking contrast between 
‘the dangers of the second Berlin and Cuba crises’ on one hand and Nikita 
Khrushchev’s version of glasnost and perestroika on the other. Khrushchev, moreover, 
was by far the most extroverted and accessible of Soviet leaders, enabling the 
Ambassador to appraise him in person on numerous occasions. Although Britain left 
the American government to negotiate with the Soviet Union over Berlin, Roberts 
advanced the British perspective in these discussions in a low-key but effective manner 
through his close ties with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson. His efforts supplemented 
the top-level Anglo-American bonds, which historians regard as being especially close 
(albeit not without problems) in the Harold Macmillan-John F. Kennedy years. The 
relationship provided Britain with the potential to influence the Cold War, balancing 
the limited influence over the Soviet Union.3 During the missile crisis – the most 
dangerous clash of the Cold War - Roberts provided his government with a vital set of 
ears and eyes in Moscow, conveying invaluable insights into Soviet conduct. The period 
also saw the Moscow Embassy develop Anglo-Soviet commercial and cultural ties – a 
dimension of East-West relations in which the British made a notably positive 
contribution. The article sheds light on the career of one of Britain’s most important and 
able – if generally unsung - Cold War diplomats, and adds to the literature of 
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diplomatic representation as well as of Anglo-Soviet relations.4 It is maintained that the 
resident embassy and ambassador still had an important role to play, despite 
arguments that developments in travel and communications technology were making 
them redundant. 
 
Roberts and the Moscow Embassy 
 
Frank Roberts joined the Foreign Office in 1930, and served in Cairo and Paris before 
the outbreak of the war, during which he was based in London. One of his first 
engagements in a Soviet issue took place in 1943, when he was Acting Head of the FO’s 
Central Department and when evidence emerged of the Soviet murder three years 
previously of 15,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. Roberts was much more 
sympathetic than were most of his colleagues to openly supporting Polish claims that 
the Russians were guilty of a war crime, maintaining that Poland ‘look[ed] to us for a 
sensible middle course and it seems important that we should not discourage them 
from looking to us by running too obviously after the Russians and Americans and 
possibly eventually falling between all possible stools’. This contrasted with the view of 
Gladwyn Jebb, a senior official in the Department of Economic Warfare, who thought 
that Polish fears that great power politics would overshadow the interests of the small 
countries were exaggerated, and who urged the Foreign Office not to be ‘moved’ by the 
‘clamour’ of the Polish government-in-exile. While Roberts had demonstrated a 
moderate cast of mind, and a willingness to reach an independent judgment, the 
constraints of the Grand Alliance meant that the British government preferred to play 
down the atrocity, resulting in controversy later.5 
 Roberts attended the Yalta conference in 1945, and played a particularly 
important role the following year as the Moscow Embassy’s chargé d'affaires. In a series 
of telegrams influenced by the American Embassy’s chargé d'affaires George Kennan, he 
explained the developing Cold War by stressing the ‘ever-increasing emphasis laid here 
upon Marxist-Leninist ideology as the basis for Soviet internal and foreign policy’. This 
had become ‘hard to distinguish from Soviet imperialism’. Demonstrating a pragmatic 
willingness to put ideology to one side, Roberts also maintained that a working 
relationship with the Soviet Union could be established ‘on the basis of zones of 
influence in which we left the other party free from interference or criticism within 
specific areas’. Furthermore, ‘maintaining our special relationship with America in a 
form consistent with friendship with the Soviet Union’ was important, too, to bolster 
Britain’s interests in an era in which British power was declining. On Roberts’ 
suggestion, the Foreign Office established a Committee on Policy towards Russia, and 
when he returned from Moscow in 1947 he became Ernest Bevin’s Principal Private 
Secretary (PPS).6 In this role he joined what was ‘as strong a team as any British Foreign 
Secretary has ever led’, dealing with key issues such as the Berlin Airlift.7 Roberts then 
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occupied the positions of Deputy High Commissioner to India, 1949-51; Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, 1954-57; and Permanent Representative to NATO, 1957-60. His time in the 
Soviet Union, his PPS role and his NATO experience gave him particular expertise in 
Soviet and German affairs. This made him ideally equipped for the role of Ambassador 
in Moscow against the background of the Berlin crisis. 
 The Embassy to which Roberts returned in autumn 1960 had about 40 diplomatic 
staff.8 The building, which was constructed in the nineteenth century, was located on 
Kutuzovsky Prospekt looking across the Moscow River towards the Kremlin. It was not 
large enough to meet the office and residential needs of a modern embassy. Whitehall 
authorised an extension, but Roberts and his colleagues argued successfully that only a 
brand new embassy would be suitable - not least because ‘the proposed extension 
would affect the garden very considerably’. This was significant because ‘large 
receptions’ were held there. Embassy staff also thought that settling for a mere 
extension would reflect poorly on Britain because ‘so many governments were building 
new large embassies’ in Moscow.9 Humphrey Trevelyan, Roberts’ successor as 
Ambassador (1962-65) recorded that after discussions with the Soviet government ‘we 
were shown a succession of wholly unsuitable sites for a new ... Embassy in the 
slummier parts’ of Moscow.10 Finally, a site on Smolenskaya Embankment fitted the bill.  
One of the difficulties with the existing embassy was a lack of safe rooms, which 
was of particular concern given the Soviet propensity for spying.11 In October 1959 
microphones were found in rooms that had been used as the registry and as the cipher 
room. Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home’s PPS A.C.I. Samuel noted ‘a distinct 
possibility’ that ‘the Russians had ... been able to read our telegrams or pick `up 
information of value’.12 Soviet surveillance was all-pervasive, even extending to 
diplomats’ living quarters. Brian Crowe noted that despite the liberalisation of the 
Soviet Union in the Khrushchev years (shown, for example, by the publication of 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s ‘One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich’ in Novy Mir 
magazine), the KGB was ‘still active. Everything was bugged. You couldn’t talk in your 
own flat without being overheard’.13 Second Secretary Dennis Amy recalled that the 
Soviets ‘would go to any lengths to compromise people’, not least by setting 
‘honeytraps’.14 The case of William J. Vassall, a former member of the Naval Attaché’s 
staff who had been sexually compromised and blackmailed into spying came to light 
late in 1962, while in 1968 Ambassador Geoffrey Harrison was forced to resign after 
becoming entangled with a Russian chambermaid working for the KGB.15 First 
Secretary John Fretwell recalled that there was a strong chance (born out by the 
Harrison case) that any Soviet citizens who diplomats encountered more than once 
were ‘acting for the KGB’, or would soon be ‘forced to do so’.16 The extent to which the 
Embassy reciprocated in the spying game is hard to gauge, but there was an MI6 station 
headed by Ruari Chisholm then by Gervase Cowell. With CIA help, Chisholm and then 
Cowell ‘ran’ GRU colonel Oleg Penkovsky, 1960-62. Cowell has been credited with a 
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potentially critical role when on 2 November 1962 he answered the telephone to hear a 
pre-arranged set of sounds (three blows of breath, repeated in another call one minute 
later) which Penkovsky was to use in the event of an imminent nuclear attack on the 
West. Cowell revealed in 2000 that he was certain that Penkovsky had been captured 
and had surrendered information about call signs. Cowell therefore did not respond, 
neither alerting Roberts nor the MI6 chief in London, Sir Dick White.17 
British Embassy officials maintained extensive ties with the Moscow diplomatic 
corps, which was of high quality because of the Soviet Union’s increased international 
importance after the Second World War.18According to Dennis Amy, there was little 
contact with ordinary Soviet citizens but ‘you saw a great deal of every other country 
you could think of’.19 Meeting with fellow members of the corps enabled the sharing of 
information and so facilitated the better understanding of the Soviet scene, and 
provided a chance to concert policies. Kempton Jenkins, a German expert at the 
American Embassy, recalled how he and British diplomats would meet regularly to 
‘analyze events, and decide what we were going to report’ to the respective 
governments.20 The experience of Soviet spying furthered the bonds, with British 
security specialists ‘sweeping’ allied embassies for listening devices. Anglo-American 
security collaboration was especially extensive, with the British acting as the senior 
partner.21 
So far as Roberts’working and managerial style is concerned, fellow diplomats 
have praised his intelligence and his work ethic, but there were also suggestions that he 
was over-ambitious, over-zealous, and reluctant to delegate. Most of the criticisms 
relate to Roberts’ time in the Foreign Office, rather than to his ambassadorships, leading 
John Zametica to suggest that he ‘was perhaps always destined to make his mark as a 
career diplomat rather than as a Foreign Office official’, which required a more self-
effacing approach.22 Roberts went down well with his staff in Moscow in the 1960s: 
Dennis Amy noted his empathy and approachability, describing him as a man who 
could ‘switch from talking about Kremlinology at the highest level to football with 
workmen’. He ‘really did care for each and every one of his people. He would talk to 
anybody about their problems in marriage or whatever they were.’23 Furthermore, if 
Kempton Jenkins’ view that Roberts was ‘a brilliant, seasoned professional’ is typical, 
then allied diplomats also thought well of the British Ambassador.24 
 
Commercial and Cultural Diplomacy 
 
The Moscow Embassy was heavily involved in developing commercial relations, 
following agreements made during Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s visit to the 
Soviet Union in February 1959.25 Soon, a Commercial Counsellor, Hilary King, was 
appointed to the Embassy,26 and a British Trade Fair was held at Sokolniki Park in 
Moscow in May-June 1961. It was one of the largest foreign exhibitions ever to take 
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place in the Soviet Union, attracting around 1½ million visits and winning the 
admiration of the Soviet government.27 At Khrushchev’s behest, the Soviets held a 
‘lavish and cordial Government reception’ on the opening day, to which 600 British 
business visitors were invited, along with members of the Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders’ band, and some stand-fitters brought over for the exhibition (the idea of 
inviting ‘workers’ only occurred to the Soviets after they had learned that Roberts was 
inviting some to his own reception at the Embassy two days later).28 Khrushchev 
himself attended the fair, showing ‘keen and approving interest in the scale and 
organisation’ of the event, and in ‘individual exhibits’ such as machinery. In what 
appeared to be an effort to foster division between the British and the Americans, 
Khrushchev commented that ‘this conception of an industrial fair, with no “way of life” 
propaganda was exactly right’ - the American exhibition of 1959 (scene of the Nixon-
Khrushchev ‘kitchen’ debate) had been ill-judged with ‘too many ugly modern 
statues’.29 
The Foreign Office reported in 1961 that the ‘most striking feature in Soviet trade 
with Western Europe ... is the emergence of the United Kingdom as the Soviet Union’s 
No. 1 trading partner, displacing West Germany [from] that position’,30 although, as 
Trevelyan noted, the relationship was distinctly one-sided: ‘The Russians bought from 
us only about half what we bought from them.’31 Britain’s efforts to use its diplomatic 
services to generate commercial opportunities reflected a common tendency among 
countries whose share of world trade was falling. The Plowden (1964), Duncan (1969) 
and Berrill (1974) reports into British representation abroad emphasised the need for 
commercial diplomacy. In 1977, the Central Policy Review Staff recommended on the 
basis of Britain’s diminished international role that export promotion should take 
priority over political work.32 
 There was good progress in the cultural as well as the commercial realm in the 
Roberts years.33 The British and Soviet governments signed agreements in December 
1959 and January 1961, providing for exchanges in education, technology, science, 
agriculture, medicine, social security and the arts.34 In respect of the latter, the Embassy 
and the British Council arranged a tour of the Soviet Union by the Old Vic the following 
month, performing Macbeth, Saint Joan, and The Importance of Being Earnest. According to 
Roberts, ‘the visit was an outstanding success’, not least because Khrushchev and 
deputy leader Anastas Mikoyan attended one of the performances. Khrushchev’s 
appearance ‘when he was busy with the Central Committee Plenum suggests that the 
Soviet authorities wished to make a gesture of goodwill towards the United Kingdom, 
at any rate in the cultural field’.35 The precise motive for the ‘gesture of goodwill’ is not 
apparent, but it was evidently a positive development, facilitated by British efforts. 
When later in 1961 the Royal Ballet visited the Soviet Union, Roberts noted that 
many Soviet officials, heads of diplomatic missions and the British and foreign press 
attended the opening night. Khrushchev not only attended but brought important 
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colleagues, including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Khrushchev’s interest in the 
arts was ‘intermittent, and such a weighty representation from the Presidium would 
normally be reserved for some cultural manifestation from Cuba, or some other 
uncommitted country whom it was desired to impress’. Although he also took the 
opportunity to lecture Roberts about Berlin during the intervals (see below), 
Khrushchev ‘followed Ondine attentively and seemed interested in what he saw’. 
Roberts described the Royal Ballet visit as ‘one of the most important, if not the most 
important, British cultural visits ever to have taken place in the Soviet Union’. His 
‘colleagues in the Diplomatic Corps were full of admiration, as were the Soviet 
audiences’.36 He commented that cultural and commercial activities were Britain’s most 
important contribution to East-West relations.37 As well as boosting Britain’s standing 
with Soviet and foreign officials in Moscow, cultural and commercial work had helped 
to make the Embassy a hive of activity. In his first year as Ambassador, Roberts and his 
colleagues entertained 6,000 visitors, along with hosting the trade fair, the Old Vic, the 
Royal Ballet and a film festival.38 
 
The Limits of the Anglo-Soviet Political Relationship 
 
These developments helped to ease what was otherwise a fraught time. Roberts noted 
early in 1961 that the collapse of the Paris summit had damaged Anglo-Soviet relations, 
and that Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen had criticised ‘Her Majesty’s 
Government in general and the Prime Minister in particular ... for our shared 
responsibility for the RB-47 incident, for the Anglo-American agreement on the Holy 
Loch base for Polaris submarines, for our alleged equivocal attitude on disarmament 
and more generally for our alleged subservience to American and even to German 
policies’.39 Ideological incongruity, the British commitment to close relations with the 
United States, and Britain’s lesser power status meant that the Anglo-Soviet political 
relationship was of limited substance. Rodric Braithwaite, who served as ambassador in 
Moscow at the end of the Cold War, commented that ‘the substance of Anglo-Russian 
or Anglo-Soviet relations has always been very thin... as a bilateral relationship neither 
country has actually cared very much about the other’. Policy issues addressed mainly 
‘within the NATO alliance and within our relations with the Americans’. Most of 
Britain’s direct dealings with the Soviet Union concerned ‘things like who was going to 
throw out whose spy first, things which are not actually the mainstream of normal, 
bilateral international relations’. Much of Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson’s 
handling of the Soviet Union was predominantly ‘gesture politics, because there was 
little bilateral substance’.40 
 Roberts noted in November 1962 in his valedictory despatch that the British 
government had shown little inclination towards holding ministerial-level, bilateral 
Anglo-Soviet meetings, due to concerns about antagonising ‘our American, German or 
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French allies’ over Berlin. Although the previous two years had been ‘neither propitious 
nor disastrous enough to encourage high-level Anglo-Soviet exchanges ...  this has not 
deterred the Americans and others from fairly frequent contacts of a distinctly political 
flavour’. Roberts suggested that these meetings had facilitated mutual understanding 
and had eased tensions. However, beyond Alec Douglas-Home’s meetings with 
Gromyko at the United Nations (UN) in New York and in disarmament talks in 
Geneva, ‘I think I am not exaggerating when I say there have been no political contacts 
as such either way for two years’. Roberts encouraged London to seek ‘more frequent 
political meetings’ with Soviet leaders.41 During his year (1963-64) as prime minister, 
Douglas-Home did not show much interest in Anglo-Soviet diplomacy,42 unlike Harold 
Wilson (in office 1964-70), who visited Moscow twice. The results of Wilson’s Soviet 
policy were limited, though, to a Consular Convention (1965) and a technological 
exchange agreement (1968),43 suggesting that Anglo-Soviet summits did not necessarily 
achieve much.  
 The limited scope of Britain’s top-level relations with the Soviet Union enabled 
the Ambassador in Moscow to conduct relations directly with the Kremlin, whose 
members fortunately were very much outward-facing. Roberts doubted ‘if any group of 
rulers is as accessible or as ready to exchange views … in their offices or at the many 
parties where we meet as are Mr. Khrushchev and his senior colleagues’. Members of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘now accept diplomatic invitations and find ways of 
returning diplomatic hospitality to a degree inconceivable when I was in the Soviet 
Union before’.44 Khrushchev set the tone with his garrulousness. John Fretwell 
recollected that he even ‘came to the Queen’s birthday party on one occasion. He was 
seen around town a great deal ... he was not sealed away’.45 The families of Ambassador 
Llewellyn Thompson and Khrushchev even shared weekend retreats.46 Roberts did not 
achieve quite the same intimacy (largely due to his country’s lesser international 
standing), but he saw Khrushchev often. There was ready access at lower levels, too. 
Fretwell noted that Embassy political staff had contact with Foreign Ministry officials, 
and that there was also ‘good contact for the commercial and cultural sides of the 
embassy, who had their own particular sphere of people with whom they had 
authorised contact’.47 
 
Roberts and the Berlin Crisis 
 
The first major diplomatic issue for the Ambassador to address was the Soviet challenge 
to Western ground access to Berlin. Since late 1958 Khrushchev had pressured the Allies 
to withdraw, by threatening to turn the issue of access over to the government of East 
Germany. The Western powers would then be obliged to extend de facto recognition to 
the East German government to begin what were likely to be unfruitful negotiations. At 
the Vienna summit with John F. Kennedy in June 1961, Khrushchev reasserted his 
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(always somewhat flexible) six-month deadline for a treaty.48 In line with London’s 
position, Frank Roberts supported talks with the Soviet Union over Berlin because he 
feared that in the absence of dialogue Khrushchev would have ‘no option but to act 
unilaterally, which can only mean a separate peace treaty’ with East Germany. The 
‘result would be that our subsequent prospects of effectively defending our rights in 
Berlin and preventing their gradual erosion without resort to force would be 
diminished’.49 Roberts recorded that on 31 July 1961, during ‘protracted conversations 
during each interval’ of the Royal Ballet performance ‘and for one and a half hours after 
the curtain had fallen’, Khrushchev spoke about Berlin.50 The Soviet leader explained 
that that he owed Harold Macmillan a hunting expedition, but it would be impossible 
to extend an invitation ‘if we had broken over Berlin and were perhaps shooting each 
other instead of elk ... the West was now threatening to cut off trade and even go to war 
if the Soviet Government signed a peace treaty’. Khrushchev brandished his nuclear 
bombs:  
 
Modern wars would be fought with nuclear weapons, ten of which could destroy 
France or for that matter the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union (and also the 
United States) would probably lose tens of millions, but the Soviet Union would 
certainly go to war if the Western Allies tried to force their way through to West 
Berlin after the Soviet Union had signed a peace treaty with the DDR [East 
Germany].51 
 
More reassuringly, he added that it would be ‘ridiculous for 200 million people to die 
over two million Berliners’.52 As Roberts noted, Khrushchev’s Royal Ballet diatribe was 
also his last ‘major attempt to persuade me that his United Nations solution’– which 
involved establishing Berlin as a ‘free city’ under the authority of the UN – ‘was the 
right one’. But Roberts thought that ‘the Berliners would not ... regard the United 
Nations as sufficient protection compared with the Americans and the rest of us’.53 
Furthermore, he recognised that at the ballet Khrushchev had not only taken the 
opportunity to vent his anxieties but also to try to detach Britain from the Americans by 
encouraging an independent British initiative.54 That, however, was not something that 
Roberts pursued, given the obvious danger to allied unity and how in any case it was 
possible to exert influence through the American government (see below). 
 Although Khrushchev sought to dislodge the Western powers from Berlin, 
Roberts understood quite correctly that the Soviet leader’s priority was, in the light of 
the mass east-to-west migration through West Berlin, keeping Germans in rather than 
keeping the Allies out. Khrushchev complained to the Ambassador more than once 
about ‘the awful problem of the best people pouring out’ of East Germany like ‘blood’. 
Khrushchev was not, despite his threat of signing a peace treaty, ‘all that keen ... on 
handing powers over to the East Germans’.55 Roberts’ emphasis on the Soviet Union’s 
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defensive motivations was consistent with the views of Alec Douglas-Home and the 
Foreign Office – London believed (in part due to Roberts’ influence) that Moscow’s 
priority was to consolidate the East German state. By contrast, American policymakers 
were inclined to see Soviet policy as aggressive, trying to undermine Western solidarity 
and challenge American prestige across the world.56 
There was a shared sense, though, in the British and American governments that 
the Soviet Union would soon take measures to resolve the Berlin question. Roberts 
certainly took this view, telling London in July that ‘the Russians’ were most anxious 
for ‘some change in the present situation’.57 Khrushchev conveyed privileged military 
information when he told him that a particular major-general who had helped to crush 
the Hungarian uprising in 1956 had been appointed to command Soviet troops around 
Berlin. The Ambassador did not appreciate that this was a warning to the Western 
powers against taking military action against the Berlin Wall, which the Soviet and East 
German authorities began constructing on the night of 13-14 August 1962. Yet the 
significance of Khrushchev’s point was far from obvious at the time, and the erection of 
the barrier certainly took most Western observers by surprise.58 
Although there was a brief confrontation between American and Soviet tanks at 
Checkpoint Charlie in the Friedrichstrasse in October,59 and later there were instances of 
Soviet obstruction of ground transport through East Germany, it is evident that the 
building of the Wall had ended the Berlin crisis – not least because in December 1961 
Khrushchev withdrew his deadline for signing a treaty with East Germany. Famously, 
President Kennedy said ‘a wall is a lot better than a war’.60 Yet the resolution of the 
crisis was not so apparent at the time, because without an agreement from the 
communist authorities Western ground access was still vulnerable, and Khrushchev 
had changed gear on the issue before. Since February 1961 Llewellyn Thompson – 
between whom and Roberts there was ‘mutual admiration’61 - had taken a more 
favourable attitude to negotiations than had many other American officials, who were 
deeply sensitive about making concessions. Roberts thought that ‘if we can get Kennedy 
to adopt this sort of line as his own it will be very good and will enable us to avoid 
appearing to be the ones who advocate compromise’. As Toshihiko Aono has explained, 
Thompson attempted to use the British stand – as conveyed by Roberts in Moscow - to 
help convince Secretary of State Dean Rusk of the importance of negotiations. At an 
Anglo-American summit in Bermuda in December 1961, the two governments agreed to 
maintain close cooperation in the forthcoming talks between Thompson and Gromyko 
in Moscow, and that Thompson would act in close consultation with Roberts. Douglas-
Home suggested that Roberts would provide the American ambassador with ‘whatever 
help he thought best’, while Kennedy said that it would be difficult for Thompson to 
‘go on alone as the substance of the matter was approached’.62 Douglas-Home duly 
instructed him to ‘help Thompson in preparing for his meetings with Gromyko and in 
analyzing their results’.63 
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Thompson held meetings with the Soviet foreign minister in January 1962, but 
the discussions soon began to falter, in part due to French and West German concerns. 
The Foreign Office believed that as the talks were now in ‘danger of petering out’ 
Roberts should intervene to ‘improve the atmosphere’. On 5 February, Rusk agreed 
with Home that ‘Roberts should go ahead . . . provided that we have German 
agreement also’. However, Bonn’s hesitation meant that matters did not go much 
further.64 While the Soviets were inclined to mock Roberts for the British failure to 
participate in the Moscow talks over Berlin,65 (trying once more to goad the British 
government into acting independently) they were unaware of how he exerted influence 
through his American colleague. Roberts had employed the ‘special relationship’ in the 
deft fashion envisioned in Macmillan’s famous ‘Greeks and Romans’ metaphor, by 
injecting the British perspective discreetly into American policies.66 
 There was other evidence of working closely with allied diplomats in Moscow in 
relation to divided Germany. On 14 February 1962, Soviet MiG fighter jets ‘buzzed’ the 
aircraft of Sir Christopher Steel, the British ambassador to West Germany, during a 
flight from Bonn to Berlin along one of the air corridors. Kempton Jenkins recalled that 
US, British, and French diplomats in Moscow decided that they had to lodge ‘an 
immediate protest in the strongest language’. The ambassadors authorised a protest, 
but there was no time to ‘wait for our … capitals to coordinate a message and send it 
back to us’. So Jenkins, John Fretwell, and Jacques Andreani drafted a firm demarche 
themselves, which they then ‘flashed … back to our capitals, and the ambassadors went 
in simultaneously [in Moscow] with these protests’. The Soviets responded in a 
conciliatory fashion. Later, Alec Douglas-Home praised ‘the drafters of the demarche 
for an outstanding job demonstrating initiative’.67 
 
Roberts and the Cuban Missile Crisis  
 
Roberts’ Moscow vantage point enabled him to provide vital ‘man on the spot’ insights 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.68 President Kennedy’s frequent 
contacts with British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore and with Macmillan during the 
crisis meant that the British government was probably better informed than any other 
government.69 Alongside ambassadors Ormsby-Gore in Washington and Herbert 
Marchant in Havana, Roberts helped to complete the picture. Some British officials 
learned of the American discovery of nuclear missiles in Cuba while attending an 
intelligence meeting at CIA headquarters on 19 October,70 so it is likely that Roberts had 
at least some advance notice before the President’s public announcement on Monday 22 
October that the United States was imposing a naval blockade around Cuba. News that 
the Soviet Union had turned the island into a nuclear base took him by surprise. Despite 
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evidence of a substantial Soviet military buildup in Cuba since summer 1962, there 
were few British and American officials who expected that Moscow would place 
nuclear missiles rather than just conventional weapons in a region of great importance 
to the United States.71 Roberts surmised that Khrushchev had anticipated little more 
than protests and a showdown in the UN, where he could complain about American 
nuclear missiles in Turkey and in Italy. The Soviet leader had not expected the US 
government to implement a blockade and to threaten an attack on the missile bases.72 
 President Kennedy complained publicly about how the Soviets had maintained 
that only defensive weapons were present on Cuba, but Roberts considered that 
assertions of Soviet deceit could only have ‘incensed’ Khrushchev and make him less 
likely to want to meet Kennedy to resolve the confrontation.73 Roberts maintained, 
pragmatically, that there was no point getting ‘worked up about Russian deceit in 
diplomacy’, as it had deep roots, and he pointed out that Moscow’s representatives had 
never said that ‘there were no long-range … missiles involved’. All the same, the 
question of whether a weapon was inherently offensive or defensive was a subjective 
point, and it was the case that long-range nuclear missiles were seen generally as ‘a 
deterrent and the full sense of the word defensive’.74 Overall, then, Roberts considered 
that Soviet deceit in relation to the missiles in Cuba violated no expectation of honesty, 
that the deception was in any case limited, and that expressing outrage could only have 
increased tensions just when cool heads and effective communication were essential to 
avoiding war. 
 Khrushchev’s chief motivation, Roberts suggested, for installing nuclear missiles 
in Cuba was to seek an ‘accretion of nuclear strength and bargaining power which the 
successful completion of the bases would have provided, and which would have shifted 
the present balance of power substantially … in the Soviet favour’.75 In 1961 the 
American government had announced publicly that it was, contrary to Khrushchev’s 
pronouncements, in a position of overwhelming nuclear superiority. Now, according to 
Roberts, stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba offered the Soviets a nuclear ‘quick fix’ by 
augmenting their striking power substantially and by bolstering their prestige. His 
emphasis on the balance of power motivation was consistent with most other Anglo-
American assessments. The British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), for example, 
stated that ‘the Russians had decided to install the missile complex because … it would 
have given them a significant increase in their nuclear striking capability against the 
United States’.76 Most US policymakers whose views are recorded accepted this 
motivation, too.77 
Significantly, though, Roberts gave equal weight to the Soviet leader’s publicly-
professed motive of preventing Cuba from ‘from being crushed’ by a US 
attack.78Against the background of the American-sponsored attack on Cuba at the Bay 
of Pigs in April 1961 and continued hostility (including ‘covert’ efforts to destabilise the 
Fidel Castro regime), the Ambassador thought that Khrushchev ‘really considered an 
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American attack … a probability’, making it ‘a Soviet interest to introduce into Cuba an 
effective deterrent’.79 (Roberts stopped short of suggesting that by creating the 
impression that Cuba was in danger, US policies were at least partly responsible for 
causing the missile crisis.) Llewellyn Thompson, who by now had completed his 
Moscow tour and had returned to Washington, was about the only US policymaker 
who thought Khrushchev was genuinely concerned about defending Cuba.80 Western 
officials tended to dismiss Khrushchev’s defence-of-Cuba justification as a post-facto 
rationalisation after he had been forced to remove the missiles in return for a pledge 
that there would be no invasion of Cuba. Any view that Cuba needed defending from 
the US was given little credence. However, post-Cold War evidence has led historians 
to give weight to the defending-Cuba justification,81 suggesting that Roberts and 
Thompson were on the right track. Their insight and empathy was surely no 
coincidence; it derived from their frequent encounters with Khrushchev, providing 
them with an understanding of Soviet concerns that home-based officials could not 
achieve.  
There was also speculation that Khrushchev placed nuclear missiles in Cuba to 
pressure the Western powers into withdrawing from Berlin. The JIC maintained that 
‘the West’s determination to maintain the status quo’ in the city had encouraged 
Khrushchev to take a drastic step to force the issue,82 while Dean Rusk and 
Undersecretary of State George Ball suggested that Khrushchev sought to use the 
missiles in Cuba to force a Cuba-Berlin ‘bargain’.83 Roberts, however, played down the 
Berlin question. He maintained that the Cuba initiative was intended ‘to improve the 
Soviet Union’s bargaining power’, but not in relation to ‘a particular issue (i.e. Berlin) at 
a particular time (i.e. this month)’.84 It has indeed become apparent that Khrushchev did 
not install the missiles in Cuba with the express intention of sacrificing them in a Berlin 
trade, or in any deal: the costs and risks of the Cuban deployment greatly exceeded the 
value of sacrificing the weapons in any balanced exchange.85 Furthermore, during the 
crisis Khrushchev firmly rejected the suggestion from his diplomats of using Berlin as a 
bargaining tool, as he did not wish to exacerbate an already fraught situation.86 The 
result was that the issue of Berlin remained quiescent. 
Of course, there were other issues to consider. On 24 October, the Soviet assistant 
naval attaché in London, Captain Yevgeny Ivanov, suggested that Britain should 
intervene to bring about a ‘conciliation’ between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.87 Ivanov was an official of the GRU and had tried to mediate over Berlin. The 
idea of a British diplomatic initiative might avert catastrophe but also threatened to 
create divisions between London and Washington, and within NATO. Roberts was 
sceptical about Ivanov’s approach, arguing that there was no reason why a ‘junior 
official in London should have complete and up to date information on matters of the 
highest policy outside his competence and on a situation which has developed so fast in 
[the] past 48 hours.’ The ‘most likely explanation’ for Ivanov’s initiative was to divide 
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Britain and the United States,88 a Soviet tactic that had been evident during the Berlin 
crisis. Furthermore, there was reason to doubt Ivanov’s credibility because he 
maintained that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba, and that the missiles could 
reach no further than Florida. Although the Ambassador did not seem to know about 
Ivanov’s status as an intelligence officer, the GRU connection may not have had a 
bearing on the value of the proposal.89 
There are different views about Macmillan’s attitude to mediation, which would 
probably have involved holding a summit conference. Len Scott notes he took the idea 
seriously, not least out of a desire to avoid catastrophe, although Peter Catterall 
maintains that the Prime Minister was wary about providing the Soviets with a chance 
to broach issues such as Berlin.90 It is likely that Macmillan saw equal measures of both 
opportunity and risk in a conference, and in any case he maintained his role of 
supporting the American position – in part due to the influence of Alec Douglas-Home. 
The latter was deeply conscious of Moscow’s duplicity and thought that Soviet 
encouragement to mediate was intended to ‘test our resolve and lay a bait to our 
vanity’.91 This view probably derived, at least in part, to the cautious counsel of Roberts, 
for whom Douglas-Home had particular respect because of Roberts’ lengthy experience 
as a diplomat.92 A paucity of Soviet sources means that it is impossible to provide a 
definitive verdict about Ivanov’s intentions, but Len Scott has suggested that he was 
probably ‘engaged on a mission from Moscow’ rather than operating independently. 
Whether the main motive was to end the confrontation using British mediation, or if it 
was, as Roberts suggested, to sow division among the Western powers, remains 
uncertain. The secondary aim, however, was ‘most certainly disinformation concerning 
Soviet nuclear forces in Cuba’.93 
While much of the world feared impending doom, Roberts emphasised that 
there was no missile crisis among most Muscovites. Life continued in a calm and 
orderly manner for the general public, and Soviet officials remained amenable.94 In 
contrast with Roberts’ experience during the Berlin crisis, now ‘there was practically no 
attempt’ from the Soviet government to emphasise ‘the gravity of the situation’. This 
signified that while the Kremlin had acted riskily it ‘did not want or expect or want its 
actions in Cuba to lead to war’.95 As was also evident in a positive response to a 
message from the would-be peacemaker Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev was keen to 
‘find a way out and to avoid action further action endangering peace’.96 On 26 October, 
the Soviet leader told the US administration that he would remove the missiles in return 
for a pledge not to invade Cuba, but the following day he raised the ante by demanding 
the removal of US Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey. The reason for the new 
demand, which posed particular difficulties for the administration because of its 
potential for dividing NATO, was central to how to respond. Deputy Undersecretary of 
the Foreign Office Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh argued that the additional demand suggested 
‘divisions in the Soviet leadership’.97 Similarly, US National Security Adviser McGeorge 
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Bundy suggested that ‘hardnosed’ officials had been responsible for the tougher 
terms.98 However, Roberts had long argued that Khrushchev was firmly in charge. He 
maintained a year earlier, for example, that ‘all the evidence suggests that Khrushchev 
stands head and shoulders above his colleagues’.99 Soon after the missile crisis Roberts 
dismissed ‘the suggestion ... that some of Khrushchev’s messages’ were ‘subsequently 
reversed by his colleagues and others the result of collective decisions’.100 The ‘crucial 
decisions at every stage were essentially his’.101 Roberts’ picture of a Khrushchev 
securely in control demonstrated a sound appreciation of power dynamics within the 
Soviet hierarchy, and has been confirmed by Soviet evidence.102 
Roberts disdained the proposal to trade the Cuban missiles for American ones in 
Turkey. He argued that it was  
 
an obvious but disingenuous try on: first because the proposition was 
proclaimed to the world [over the Soviet world radio service] long before 
President Kennedy could have digested it, if not before he received it; and 
secondly because of the expressive protestations of high-mindedness with which 
he surrounded it.103 
 
The Turkish missile proposal demonstrated Khrushchev’s ‘talent and his methods: he 
offers to trade something he does not really control for something long in the hands of 
his opponent’. Roberts clearly did not consider the US missiles in Turkey and the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba to be analogous, perhaps because Cuba was of much greater sensitivity 
to the US government than Turkey was to the Kremlin. Roberts expected that Kennedy 
would reject Khrushchev’s offer while exposing its disingenuousness. However, the US 
administration responded to the Turkey overture by accepting a secret ‘backchannel’ 
deal on Sunday 28 October to withdraw the Jupiter missiles within six months, 
alongside pledging publicly that the US would not invade Cuba. Unaware of the 
clandestine US commitment (even many American officials were also in ignorance), 
Roberts was astonished at how Khrushchev appeared to engage in a ‘complete climb-
down over Cuba, accepting every American requirement, even including the United 
Nations inspection of the dismantling of Soviet bases’. He explained the seeming 
abandonment of the Jupiter demand by explaining that the Soviet leader ‘feared early 
United States action against Cuba’.104 
Evidence has suggested that Khruschev’s demand for the withdrawal of the 
Jupiters reflected a search for suitable terms under which to make a concession he had 
already decided to make, with him recognising from the beginning of the crisis that the 
situation could escalate dangerously. By Saturday 27 October, he also had cause for 
concern about a letter from Fidel Castro proposing a nuclear first-strike on the United 
States in the event of an American invasion of Cuba, and about how on the same day 
Soviet forces shot down an American U-2 aircraft over Cuba (intensifying the pressure 
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in Washington for military action), and how another U-2 strayed into Soviet territory 
(potentially sparking a nuclear conflagration through misperception by the Soviet 
military).105 All this meant that the American concession on Turkey played at most only 
a minor role in the Soviet capitulation. Roberts therefore did not need to know about 
the secret deal to understand correctly that Khrushchev retreated out of knowledge that 
the Soviet Union was in a position of military weakness in the Caribbean, and that the 
Soviet leader fully recognised the danger of the confrontation. 
Soon after the resolution of the crisis, David Ormsby-Gore suggested linking the 
security of Cuba with that of Berlin, as a way of preserving the Western position in the 
city, but Roberts dissented. The Ambassador maintained that after the ‘Cuban climb-
down’ Khrushchev was ill-poised to make  
 
concessions to the West on an issue so vital to the USSR and to him personally as 
Berlin. For us to raise Berlin at this juncture would be tantamount to inviting him 
to restate his well-known position more intractably than ever and to call upon 
the West ... for concessions on our part to balance his ‘statesmanship’ over 
Cuba.106 
 
Roberts’ argument helped to ensure that Ormsby-Gore’s suggestion went no further. It 
was logical that just as Khrushchev had refrained from exploiting Berlin during the 
missile crisis, the United States and its allies should avoid exploiting the missile crisis 
victory to secure advantage in Berlin – otherwise the tensions that had blighted East-
West relations in 1961 could well reignite. 
 While in the short-term Khrushchev escaped unscathed from his capitulation 
over missiles in Cuba, Roberts predicted that his authority would suffer among ‘hard-
headed Party functionaries who remember Stalin, who have access to Western 
appraisals of political developments and who know what Peking’s judgment is’. There 
would ‘at the least be a leaven of Khrushchev doubters and conceivably a potential 
nucleus of opposition to their present leader’.107 Although foreign policy issues were not 
the sole reason for Khrushchev’s downfall (in October 1964), Soviet Ambassador in 
Washington Anatoly Dobrynin noted that when the plenary meeting of the Central 
Committee was agreeing the dismissal ‘many delegates strongly criticized his personal 
role in creating the Cuban crisis’. Dmitri Polyanski, for example, complained that the 
Cuban debacle ‘damaged the international prestige of our country, our party, and our 
armed forces, while … helping to strengthen US prestige’.108 
Roberts’ longer-range forecasting was less impressive, though, reflecting an 
exaggerated view of the Soviet Union’s underlying vigour. He pointed out in his 
valedictory despatch in November 1962 that  
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...the century ahead could easily become a Russian century to succeed the 
present American century ... the Soviet Union has shown that it can stand the 
strain of a heavy armaments programme and of space research and at the same 
time increase its standard of living, however slowly and inadequately.109 
 
Roberts’ belief in the inherent vitality of the Soviet system today seems odd even in 
relation to a state that worked hard to conceal its defects, and which effectively 
surrendered in the Cold War in the 1980s. Nonetheless, the flawed assessment was of 
little immediate significance, not least because the Soviet Union was able to implement 
a substantial build-up of its nuclear forces in the wake of the missile crisis to reach 
parity with the United States by 1969. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As G.R. Berridge has noted, by the early 1960s there were those who were arguing that 
the resident embassy was becoming an anachronism.110 It was maintained that the 
advance of travel and communication technologies enabled the bypassing of 
ambassadors in negotiations; that the growth of multilateral institutions increased the 
opportunity for direct international dealings; and that the growth of the mass media 
obviated the information-gathering function of the resident embassy. The criticisms can 
all be countered in the case of Roberts’ Embassy. First, top-level dealings between the 
London and Moscow governments were limited, as we have seen, although historians 
have noted that summit conferences can create more, not less, work for ambassadors; 
second, Cold War rivalry meant Britain and the Soviet Union were not parties to the 
same international organisations, except the UN, so limiting opportunities for mutual 
engagement; and, third, Moscow was poorly covered by press correspondents, who in 
any case do not always ask the most pertinent questions.111 Furthermore, while it is 
clear that in a broadly adversarial relationship with the host state an embassy usually 
has less routine business to transact, the hostility is likely to mean, in turn, the increased 
risk of crises, in which the ambassador’s assessments – conveyed to the home 
government through the technology of rapid communications - can be crucial. This was 
certainly the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, an especially volatile and dangerous 
episode. 
 The Moscow Embassy’s role under Frank Roberts in the development of 
commercial and cultural ties with the Soviet Union was also laudable, not least because 
relations in these spheres offered a chance to offset political tensions (such as the 
collapse of the four-power Paris summit in May 1960), while commercial bonds in 
particular provided a means of exerting a discernible influence on Soviet policies.112 On 
political questions, Roberts worked closely with allied diplomats, with Anglo-American 
cooperation being particularly striking and providing an opportunity to influence 
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policy-making in Washington. This was evident in the aftermath of the construction of 
the Berlin Wall, when Roberts encouraged talks between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The notable ease and frequency of Roberts’ dealings with Soviet officials 
and politicians, including Khrushchev, derived from their accessibility but also from the 
good standing of the Ambassador and his staff. Roberts’ assessments of decision-
making in the Kremlin were speculative rather than definitive, and he did not anticipate 
either the construction of the Berlin Wall or the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba. 
Nonetheless, he was not alone in this, and he was still able to appreciate the distribution 
of power in the Soviet government and to understand Nikita Khrushchev. This 
mattered, because, as former British Ambassador to the Soviet Union William Hayter 
suggested, ‘so much of the future of the world depended’ on the attitudes and impulses 
of ‘those strange, powerful figures’ in the Kremlin.113 Overall, Frank Roberts performed 
well in Moscow, and it is clear that there was ‘never a dull moment’ for him.  
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